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当前位置：资源与环境科学进展 > 2024年 3卷 (3)期

Open Access Article

Advances in Resources and Environmental Science. 2024; 3: (3) ; 18-31 ; DOI: 10.12208/j.aes.20241019.

Policy orientation and Environmental impact: The impact of reassignment of government officials in prefecture-level cities on urban carbon intensity in China
政策导向与环境影响：中国地级市主政官员调任对城市碳排放的影响

作者： 刘宇姗 *

东北石油大学经济管理学院黑龙江大庆

*通讯作者：刘宇姗,单位：东北石油大学经济管理学院黑龙江大庆；

本文属于新变化与新挑战：数字时代下能源转型与绿色发展专题特刊稿件

黑龙江省哲学社会科学规划青年项目（23JYC274）大庆市哲学社会科学规划青年项目（DSGB2023167）东北石油大学引导性创新基金项目（2023YDW-02）

发布时间: 2024-09-27 总浏览量: 208

PDF 全文下载引用本文

摘要

双碳目标的背景下，节能降碳已成为各级政府的重点关注。基于官员晋升锦标赛理论、政治周期理论等利用中国地级市碳排放数据，探究地方官员调任对城市碳强度的影响，阐明政府科学技术支出的作用机制，并考虑官员异质性的作用（包括履新年龄和任职周期）。研究结论：①地方官员调任促进辖区内碳强度下降；②地方官员调任会通过政府科学技术支出加强对城市碳强度的抑制影响。③相比于市委书记而言，市长对辖区内碳强度的影响更为显著；但是在市委书记临近退休时，对辖区内碳强度的影响又增强了。④进一步的城市地域、资源类型和财富等级差异都在一定程度上影响官员调任与城市碳强度的关系。提出加强地方官员横、纵向流动、促进地方官员考评体系多元化和调动公众监督能动性等建议。

关键词： 地方官员调任；城市碳强度；政策导向；技术创新；低碳发展

Abstract

In the context of the two-carbon goal, energy conservation and carbon reduction have become the focus of governments at all levels. Based on the official promotion tournament theory and the political cycle theory, this paper uses the carbon emission data of prefecture-level cities in China to explore the impact of the transfer of local officials on urban carbon intensity, clarify the mechanism of government science and technology expenditure, and consider the role of official heterogeneity (including the age of tenure and tenure period). The conclusions are as follows: (1) The transfer of local officials promotes the decrease of carbon intensity in the jurisdiction; (2) The transfer of local officials will strengthen the restraining effect on urban carbon intensity through government spending on science and technology. (3) Compared with the party secretary, the mayor has a more significant impact on the carbon intensity in his jurisdiction; But as the party secretary nears retirement, the impact on the carbon intensity of his jurisdiction increases. (4) Further differences in urban region, resource type and wealth level all affect the relationship between official transfer and urban carbon intensity to some extent. Suggestions were put forward to strengthen the horizontal and vertical flow of local officials, promote the diversification of the evaluation system of local officials and mobilize the initiative of public supervision.

Key words： Transfer of local officials; Urban carbon intensity; Policy orientation; Technological innovation; Low-carbon development

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引用本文

刘宇姗, 政策导向与环境影响：中国地级市主政官员调任对城市碳排放的影响[J]. 资源与环境科学进展, 2024; 3: (3) : 18-31.

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